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Recent "paradigm shifting" research in consumer behavior dealing with reconstructive memory 
processes suggests that advertising can exert a powerful retroactive effect on how consumers remember 
their past experiences with a product. Building on this stream of research, we have executed three 
studies that incorporate the use of false cues with the aim of shedding new light on how post-experience 
advertising exerts influence on recollection. Our first experiment investigates an important but yet 
unexplored issue to advertisers who are perhaps reticent about embracing this paradigm: Does the false 
cue fundamentally change how consumers process information? After finding that when the false 
information goes undetected it is processed in a similar manner as more "truthful" cues, we use this 
paradigm to shed light on the pictorial versus verbal information debate in advertising. We discuss the 
implications of our findings for those interested in managing consumer experience and for advertising 
researchers seeking indirect measures of the influence of advertising. 
Remember your childhood visit to Disneyland?—Cinderella's castle glistening, the cartoon 
characters laughing, grouping for photos, the many rides with their height requirements, the smells of 
freshly cooked food, and Bugs Bunny shaking your hand? As you bring that experience to mind, you may 
have the feeling you are reliving it, seeing your childhood pass through your mind's eye, much like 
reviewing a video-tape. But the way human memory works is very different from that of a video tape 
recorder—our memories are actually re-constructions of bits and pieces of information we have 
obtained over time. Sometimes those reconstructions are very similar to what we experienced; other 
times we are "tricked" and remember things differently than how they actually happened. Bugs Bunny is 
not a Disney character, yet some people "remember" him as being part of their childhood experience 
after hearing that suggestion. What leads to such memory alterations, and what if they could be 
directed by advertisers?  
The nature of consumer experience has been an area of interest to advertising researchers 
because of the interesting paradox it presents: Experiences have the potential for malleability and 
manipulation, yet consumers trust their experiences most within their decision making (Hoch 2002). 
Advertisers have been interested in ways in which they can "transform" the nature of the consumer 
experience by setting expectations that influence the way consumers attend to in-formation (Hoch and 
Deighton 1989). As Wells puts it: "Advertising helps consumers interpret these experiences. It suggests 
what should be noticed. It provides cues and clues to help consumers understand and appreciate their 
feelings. And in this way it can change the nature of the response" (1986, p. 9). When advertising works 
in this manner, it can exert an insidious effect on consumer behavior. For instance, a classic experiment 
done by Olson and Dover (1979) found that advertising received prior to a bitter coffee experience 
made consumers tolerate and appreciate the taste more than those who did not receive the advertising.  
Most of the research that has investigated how advertising can influence experience has 
assessed "forward framing," where the advertising is presented before the experience (e.g., Boulding et 
al. 1993; Deighton 1984; Deighton and Schindler 1988; Olson and Dover 1979). More recent research, 
how-ever, suggests that advertising received after an experience can exert an impact by influencing how 
that experience is remembered (Braun 1999).  
Although the effect of post-experience advertising on consumer memory has been 
demonstrated (Braun 1999), we still know very little about what is leading to those effects, such as what 
type of advertising will have the most influence on consumer memory. Nor do we know the boundary 
conditions of this effect: Might there be a point where advertising can go too far in its attempt to 
reframe the past? These questions are important to advertising researchers, because the opportunities 
for advertisers to shape experiences after they have transpired are quite common, as most advertising is 
for mature products—those for which consumers have already had an experience.  
Market-level data finds that advertising is noticed more after a consumer has used a product 
(Lodish et al. 1995), per-haps due to dissonance reduction. In fact, there is a whole type of advertising—
nostalgia—that works by referencing aspects of consumers' past experiences (e.g., Baumgartner, Sujan, 
and Bettman 1992). Furthermore, due to reconstructive processes in memory, the influence of 
advertising on consumers' recollections of the past is likely to be greater than their ability to transform 
the future (Schacter 1996).  
The reconstructive view of memory has been well established within psychology, neuroscience, 
biology, and now marketing research, but there is an implicit belief in the advertising literature that 
consumer memory is based on a re-productive store (e.g., Ehrenberg et al. 2002). We therefore begin 
the present study by distinguishing between reproductive and reconstructive views of memory, and 
review moderators from the cognitive psychology literature that appear to influence the way post-
experience can be used to modify an existing memory. We incorporate these factors into our discussion 
of post-experience advertising design, specifically regarding pictorial versus verbal information 
presentation. Because measurement of advertising's influence on memory is critical, we present several 
different methods for elucidating the effects that advertising has on memory for past experiences. We 
then present three studies that investigate advertising's retroactive influence on consumer memory, 
and discuss their significance for advertising researchers. 
Background 
Reproductive versus Reconstructive Memory  
Sir Frederic Bartlett (1932) early on suggested that memory was not merely a reproduction of 
past experience, but rather a complex reconstruction by which we give meaning to our experiences, 
influenced both by what we knew before the experience transpired and what we learned afterward. He 
believed that in order for us to make a sensible picture of our world, it might only be natural that the 
memory system mix fact with interpretation in such a way that they become indistinguishable. 
In contrast, the traditional reproductive theories of memory imply that stored mental 
representations of past experiences are elicited intact during recall (Reber 1985). This viewpoint is 
implicit in how advertisers model the effects of advertising, believing that a one-to-one correspondence 
exists between what was seen and what can be later retrieved, and that once memory reaches long-
term storage, it is always accessible.  
Ehrenberg and colleagues state: 
Once a message or image is placed in our long-term memory, it seems virtually never to be forgotten 
(e.g., Hunter 1964; Franzen and Bouwman 2001). Formal recognition tests and general experience have 
long confirmed this (e.g., recognizing the picture seen once 20 years ago, or the first chord of 
Beethoven's Seventh, for those who know the Seventh). The capacity of our memory is without question 
vast—each of us routinely remembers so much. (Ehrenberg et al. 2002, p. 10)  
Advertisers have been urged to find the appropriate "cue" so that consumer memory can be 
unlocked and used in decision making (Keller 1987, 1991). This traditional view assumes that a retrieval 
cue merely arouses or activates a memory that is slumbering in the brain. Within the advertising 
domain, consumers are thought to have a memory trace for the ad and a memory trace for their 
experience, which are separate and in-dependent entities; any failure to remember either type of in-
formation is due to faulty retrieval cues (Ehrenberg et al. 2002). 
The reconstructionist view, meanwhile, finds that such related information may combine 
together so that when a past experience is recalled, the advertising information may infiltrate that 
memory. We believe that when the advertising has become internalized in this manner and becomes 
part of the consumer's own memory, this represents the ultimate in advertising persuasion—the 
consumer now owns the advertising material. 
The reproductive view is intuitively appealing, and the emotion or vividness associated with 
bringing a past memory to mind may provide us an illusion of its veracity; however, failure to recognize 
memory's reconstructive nature can lead advertisers in wrong directions. For example, assuming past 
experience is veridical, an advertiser may not target consumers who had a past bad experience with 
their product and could therefore miss out on an opportunity to win them back. Or believing that a 
positive memory will always be so, an advertiser may leave the unassuming category leader open to 
competitors who try to engineer their own relationships/histories with customers.  
To differentiate the traditional reproductive view of memory from the reconstructionist view, 
one has to show that post-experience information can alter how the consumers remember the 
experience. Within cognitive psychology, there has been a large stream of research dedicated to doing 
just that; these researchers find that post-experience information can influence memories for prior 
experiences, ranging from the alteration of details to the creation of entirely false experiences (Loftus 
1982).  
To apply the false memory research from psychology to the typical advertising situation, we 
assert that the processes consumers use as they retrieve memories do not differ de-pending on the 
veracity of the information. Research finds that when people retrieve both true and false memories, 
similar brain regions are activated, so that those recalling a false memory have the same sense of 
confidence and belief in their recollection as those who were recalling an accurate memory (Schacter 
1996). We suggest that where the processes differ is during encoding. Research finds that when people 
notice the falsity of the claim at encoding, they are much less likely to be influenced at retrieval (Dodson 
and Schacter 2001; Loftus 1979). Therefore, one way to assess the influence of advertising acceptance is 
to ascertain at the ad presentation precisely who notices the falseness of the advertising and who does 
not. 
Types of Information 
Not all post-experience cues are equivalent in their ability to conjure up the past. From the well-
documented research in cognitive psychology, we can extract some guidelines for the type of 
information that works best in influencing memories. For instance, the more similar the suggested post-
experience activity is to what people actually experienced, the more likely source confusion may occur 
and result in memory distortion (Johnson et al. 1988). In addition, the more credible the source—for 
example, a police officer versus a "goofy man" providing the details—the more likely the post-
experience information will be accepted and integrated into one's original memory (Lampinen and 
Smith 1995). 
More plausible post-experience information (for example, suggesting something that potentially 
may have happened, such as meeting Mickey Mouse at Disney World) is much more likely to influence 
one's memory than if the claim seems implausible (such as encountering aliens at the park) (Pezdek, 
Finger, and Hodge 1997). The more times one receives the post-experience information, the more 
familiar it becomes, and the more likely it will be taken as fact and integrated into memory (Zaragoza 
and Mitchell 1996). Within the experimental setting, it has been found that false post-experience 
information will more likely be accepted if it is subtle and the participants do not notice the discrepancy 
(Tousignant, Hall, and Loftus 1986). 
Advertising Issues  
The research on reconstructive memories within a marketing context is much newer than that in 
psychology, with much of the emphasis being on whether or not advertising can, in fact, influence a 
consumers past experience because of its low credibility. Once advertising was found to influence the 
past (e.g., Braun and Loftus 1998), the interest was in what type of experience could be altered through 
post-experience information, as in whether a really negative experience could be made to seem better 
in retrospect (Braun 1999). 
Only recently has there has been an interest in what types of advertising execution—such as 
autobiographical referencing—might influence the past (Braun, Ellis, and Loftus 2002). There has been 
little research on determining the "boundary effect" of misinformation, that is, the point at which it will 
be detected and not influence the original memory.  
The choice of executional style utilized in the present re-search began with where that prior 
research on autobiographical advertising left off. Researchers have found that consumers need a 
motivating cue to recollect their past experience (Baumgartner, Sujan, and Bettman 1992), and that this 
can best be done through an autobiographical advertisement. Autobiographical ads that are emotionally 
arousing and en-gaging have been found to be effective for memory reconstruction to occur (Braun, 
Ellis, and Loftus 2002). In fact, this is consistent with research in forward-framing literature, where 
drama ads that show the product in use have been linked to transformational effects (Boiler 1990; Wells 
1986), and ads with high affective content have been linked to this process as well (Aaker and Stayman 
1992). 
The issue we chose to specifically concentrate on for the present research was how to represent 
the target information within the ad itself. For a print ad, there are two ways this can be done: verbally 
or pictorially. Traditionally, the false memory research has used verbal cues, touting a modality-free 
view of semantic memory (Pezdek 1977).  
Within advertising, there has been a long-standing debate about whether information is 
conveyed better through pictorial or verbal means. There had been a bias to convey important 
information in explicit verbal form (Rossiter and Percy 1980). Stafford (1996) found that verbal cues 
outweighed pictorial ones for conveying information about a service experience. Smith (1991) found 
that inferences derived from advertising copy were stronger than those derived from pictures. Edell and 
Staelin (1983) found that verbal cues were necessary for pictures to be processed and later 
remembered, and in a similar vein, Phillips (2000) found that headlines helped people interpret complex 
pictures and enhanced the ad's likeability. 
However, other researchers support the well-known picture superiority effect on memory (e.g., 
Childers and Houston 1984; Gardner and Houston 1986) where there is an advantage for information 
presented as a picture over words. For example, while generally supporting the importance of 
inferences made from ad copy, Smith (1991) found that when verbal and pictorial information were at a 
mismatch, people tended to rely on the pictorial information.  
Hirschman (1986) found that pictures in ads made people feel more familiar with products than 
did verbal information. Yi (1990) found that pictorial cues helped enhance product beliefs, and when 
they were absent, persuasion was more effective through indirect verbal means. 
Thus far, the false memory research does not provide much insight into how the modality will 
influence how the advertising information will be embraced and internalized as one's own memory. For 
instance, in support of the modality-free view of semantic memory, Braun and Loftus (1998) presented 
misinformation in an advertisement either as a picture or words, and found about equal levels of false 
memories across conditions. 
In addition, when dealing with a piece of information that is quite blatantly false to some 
consumers, one might argue that misinformation that is less detectable may float under the consumers' 
conscious radar screen and be adapted. As Loftus and Pickrell state: "New information invades us like a 
Trojan horse, precisely because we do not detect its influence" (1995, p. 720).  
On the other hand, when dealing with a memory of an experience that has transpired many 
years ago (as opposed to Braun and Loftus [1998], whose experience occurred fifteen minutes earlier), 
pictures or images can trigger stronger "remembering" (Schacter et al. 1996). Rossiter and Percy (1980) 
found that pictorial content in advertising is especially capable of stimulating pictorial imagery. 
According to Bartlett (1932), an image is a device for picking out bits of schemes from memory, and 
increases the chances of variability in the reconstruction of a past event. When people recount past 
experiences, they often begin by pictorializing perceptual de-tails and embellishing based on those 
details (Belli and Loftus 1996). 
While Braun and Loftus (1998) found no difference be-tween modalities in the total number of 
false memories created, the pictorial information led to stronger "remembering" judgments (where 
participants stated they could see the candy bar in their mind's eye). Recently, Wade and colleagues 
(2002) found that doctored photographs led to an exceptionally high rate of creating false 
autobiographical memories. Clearly, the issue of information modality is an important one to advertising 
researchers interested in evoking and directing aspects of consumers' past, but it is in need of additional 
study. 
Assessing Influence  
According to Clark, "Asked about the power of advertising in research surveys, most agree it 
works, but not on them" (1985, p. 13). This statement represents one of the problems with research on 
advertising effects: People do not want to admit they have been influenced. In other cases, they may 
not realize they have been influenced, because that influence operated below their conscious 
awareness (Zaltman 1997). To get a better understanding of how advertising works, there is a need to 
find indirect measures that take into account the complexity of human memory (Hall 2002).  
This research proposes looking at the transformation of consumer experience indirectly through 
the memories influenced by the ad s exposure. Cognitive psychologists have developed the 
"misinformation paradigm," where participants experience an event, such as seeing an accident. Next, 
some participants are given misinformation, such as pro-viding false information about the accident, 
while others are given no such information. Last, participants are tested for their memory of the original 
experience. Those who have incorporated the false information into their memory are said to have a 
"misinformation effect" or "false memory" (Loftus 1977). 
This same misinformation paradigm has been applied to advertising situations, both with a very 
strict replication (Braun and Loftus 1998) and with more leniency (Braun 1999). As found in the 
psychological arena, those who incorporate information from advertising received after an experience 
have created a "false memory." While we are certainly not suggesting that advertisers ought to 
consciously seek to alter consumers' memories (this may be happening nevertheless, due to the 
reconstructive nature of recall), we propose that this paradigm allows us to determine when advertising 
will have an effect on how consumers remember their past experiences. It is important theoretically to 
include false information in the post-experience advertisement to determine whether the ad is merely 
awakening an existing memory (as the current implicit view of reproductive memory might state) or 
having an influence on the reconstruction process. For instance, the incidence of distorted or false 
memories across advertising conditions serves as a measure of advertising's influence on consumers' 
pasts.  
Because of the need for ecological validity in their results, cognitive psychologists have moved 
from strictly controlled settings where both the experience and misinformation are manufactured, to 
more natural environments where the post-experience information seeks to influence participants' 
actual pasts (e.g., Garry et al. 1996). Following the strictly con-trolled experiments of Braun (1999), 
Braun and her colleagues have also moved in this direction. For instance, Braun, Ellis, and Loftus (2002) 
looked at how an autobiographical ad for Disney might alter how consumers remember their own child-
hood experiences there. This move represents a greater connection between the experimental testing 
of advertising's influence on reconstruction and how advertisers ultimately might incorporate these 
findings, but it does sacrifice some experimental control.  
However, there is an important difference between the single-exposure controlled taste 
experience (Braun 1999) and the important autobiographical memories that are most of-ten referenced 
in advertising. Information about the self, such as important rituals (birthdays) or first experiences 
(visiting Disney as a child), tend to be remembered better than other information (Neisser 1982). In 
addition, there is also evidence that autobiographical memories may rely on different brain mechanisms 
than purely episodic memories (Schacter 1996), which means there is a possibility that what appears to 
influence a one-time episodic memory in a lab situation may be different than what influences 
autobiographical recall out-side the lab. Therefore, the current study continues down the realism path, 
investigating how advertising might influence one's memory of an important autobiographical event—
visiting Disney World.  
The measurement of misinformation effects has become more sophisticated, allowing 
researchers to better differentiate processes involved in retrieval. Newer measurement devices based 
on implicit processes are used in the present studies, which could be used more generally for studying 
advertising effectiveness. For instance, response latencies pro-vide information about the accessibility of 
the memory data, with faster identifications generally indicating that material was more "top of mind" 
(Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). In addition, programs such as the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) allow researchers to determine how well the advertising information has been incorporated into 
consumers' general knowledge (ibid.). In this test, participants categorize information. If the advertising 
changes how key items featured in the ad are later categorized, then one can determine whether the 
advertising is having an influence on semantic memory.  
We posit that one of the problems with the discrepancies found in the aforementioned verbal 
versus pictorial debate in advertising may be due to measurement differences in the studies. Others 
have suggested that verbal processing requires more conscious thinking (Rossiter and Percy 1980), 
which may be better picked up on explicit tests of memory. For ex-ample, the research touting verbal 
superiority relies on inference processes, and is generally tested with verbal measures. In contrast, the 
research finding support for the importance of pictures suggests that the picture creates a sense of 
familiarity or positive affect toward the product. 
In fact, more recent research suggests pictorial advertising information may "prime" consumers 
unconsciously, and could thus be measured more effectively with indirect or implicit tests (Schmitt 
1994). Although we don't expect to offer a definitive answer on the modality debate, we do hope that 
some of the tools used in our experiments will shed light on this very complex issue.  
Research Questions and Study Overview  
To apply the false memory paradigm to advertising research, our first research question was 
whether advertising that contains false information would be processed in a similar way as "true” 
advertising. In Experiment 1, we use the same basic design that was used in Braun, Ellis, and Loftus 
(2002) to investigate this issue. Participants saw a Disney ad that either mentions Bugs Bunny (false 
information) or Mickey Mouse (true information), and then filled out some rating scales. Later they were 
asked about their own childhood visit to the park.  
We expected that those who received the "true" and "false" ads would rate the ads in a similar 
fashion, have similar attitudes toward Disney, and have relatively positive memories of their past 
experience at the park. The only aspect in which we expected a differentiation was in the degree to 
which participants would identify Bugs Bunny, the false cue, as having been part of their original 
experience. Because the Bugs Bunny reference may have been highly discrepant to some participants, 
we expected those who noticed the discrepancy (our "Bugs detectors") at advertising encoding to not be 
influenced by the advertising, and to provide us with a measure in which we could observe the 
boundary effects for advertising misinformation. 
After demonstrating that this false memory paradigm is appropriate for studying how 
advertising information can transform consumer memories, our next research question was what type 
of information—pictorial or verbal, or a combination of both modalities—was leading to the memory 
changes. If consumers consciously need to attend to and use the false information as part of their 
retrieval process to be accepted, we would expect that more information would be better, where those 
participants who had received the false information in both pictorial and verbal form would have more 
created memories (Paivio 1971). 
If it is better not to draw attention to the false information, however, more might be less, and 
perhaps the less vivid verbal information would become more integrated into memory. In Experiment 2, 
to provide some insight into the modality debate, we look at the number of false memories and the 
number of "Bugs detectors" across conditions where the false Bugs information is presented in pictorial-
only, verbal-only, or both modalities. In Experiment 3, we use reaction time software and additional 
memory tests to unveil the level of consumer processing of the pictorial and verbal information. 
Experiment 1 
 The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether true and false autobiographical 
advertising would be processed and influence memories in a similar manner. We expected that the false 
information would change what consumers re-membered about their experience at Disney. We 
expected that those who recognized the falseness of the ad claim at exposure would be less likely to 
create false memories than those who did not notice the discrepancy.  
 Method  
Participants  
Sixty-six undergraduates (32 female, 34 male) at a large North-western university participated in 
this experiment for course credit. The average age was 21. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions.  
Design 
A single-factor (true/false advertising information) design was used. The ads were 
autobiographical in nature, compelling the reader to remember his or her own past experience by 
providing a vignette of a "typical" Disney experience, similar to the one used in Braun, Ellis, and Loftus 
(2002). An ex-ample of the false autobiographical ad appears in Figure 1. 
The "truthful" ad featured the probable event of shaking hands with Mickey Mouse, whereas 
the "false" ad featured shaking hands with Bugs Bunny, who is a Warner Bros, character and would 
never have been part of a childhood experience at Disney. Either a picture of Bugs or Mickey appeared 
at the bottom of the ad, along with the textual mention of that character.  
Procedure 
The ads were passed out within a questionnaire in a mass class setting. Participants were told to 
read and evaluate it. They were then asked to rate their attitude, affect, and likelihood of visiting Disney 
in the future. Next, they were asked about their own past experience visiting Disney, and whether they 
had seen certain characters at the park. To keep the memory reports as constant across participants as 
possible, we asked them to write specifically about their earliest child-hood visit to the park. Last, they 
completed demographic in-formation and answered questions that measured demand. After the 
instructor collected the questionnaires, the participants received a short debriefing in which they 
learned about false memory research. 
Measures 
 The main dependent measures can be divided into three groups: (1) those that asked about the 
advertisement and those that were given during exposure to the ad, (2) those that asked about attitudes 
toward Disney that immediately followed the ad measures, and (3) those that asked about participants' 
memories of visiting Disney as children. A full description of these measures appears in Appendix A. 
Results 
Coding Procedure 
Two independent judges coded respondents' reactions to the ads, and the recall statements of 
their Disney experience. Specifically, they coded the number of words participants used in response to 
the ad, whether their reactions to the ad were personal or concentrated on critiquing ad elements, and 
whether or not they noticed that Bugs Bunny did not belong in a Disney ad. For the memory measures, 
they coded the number of words in the recall statement and how many items that had appeared in the 
ad were mentioned as being part of the participants' own memory. The coders had no knowledge of the 
experimental hypotheses. Their interrater reliability was .9, and an average was used for the analysis.  
True Versus False Advertising  
Did the false information influence how consumers processed the advertising? Table 1 contains 
the means for both conditions on the ad processing, Disney, and memory measures. 
 There were no significant differences between the true and false ad formats on any of the ad or 
brand-related measures, suggesting that the false information did not change how the consumers 
processed the ads or how they felt about Disney. In the coding of the response to advertising, however, 
we found that some participants who received the false Bugs information immediately noted the 
discrepancy in the advertising information, that Bugs was not connected to Disney (eight total). For 
example, one "Bugs detector" said: "Well, the picture of Disneyland looks great, and exciting colors add 
some character to it, but I see one problem with this ad, and that is that Bugs Bunny is NOT a Disney 
character. He is a Warner Bros, character, which throws the ad off."  
Another participant said that the false information was affecting how she felt about Disney: 
"The glaring mistake of putting Bugs Bunny (he is Warner Bros.) just adds to the displacement of any 
positive feelings that the ad tries to convey through its memories. It's just really not attention-grabbing 
(except for asking what Bugs is doing in a Disney ad)." Unfortunately, the number of these detectors was 
too small to do a statistical analysis on the measures, but it appears from these and similar comments 
that these participants were not processing or integrating the advertising information in the same 
manner as those who accepted the Bugs information. 
The next issue of interest was whether the recollections of participants who received the true 
advertising presentation would differ significantly from those who received the false advertising 
presentation. Overall, the memory measures did not differ across conditions on length, emotion, 
importance, or any of the measures mentioned in Table 1. The only difference was in the identification 
of Bugs as having been part of their past experience; there was an overall effect of the false information, 
where those who received it recalled more Bugs memories than those who did not, 22% versus 7%. (It 
was expected that even in the control condition, there might be some people who confused Bugs Bunny 
with their Disney memory due to exposure of Bugs in other venues; the comparison allows us to 
determine the effect of this particular advertising exposure.) This same pattern occurred for the 
"confidence in meeting Bugs" item, where there was an overall effect of the false information, M = 2.3 
for confidence in the false condition, versus M = 1.3 in the true condition. As expected, those 
participants who detected the falseness of Bugs were unlikely to later say they met Bugs at the park. 
Demand Effect 
None of our participants guessed that the purpose of the experiment was to see whether the ad 
could alter their memory of a childhood experience. Most noted that they thought the purpose was to 
see how an ad could get consumers to remember their past, but few thought the ad changed what they 
had remembered.  
Discussion  
The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether consumers would process true and 
false advertising differently, and whether such content choices would subsequently influence what they 
remembered about their past. If all participants in the false condition "caught on" as "Bugs detectors," 
we would question whether this paradigm would be appropriate for studying advertising s ability to 
influence the past. However, we found that participants in both conditions became emotionally involved 
with the advertising, and this involvement led to the reconstruction of past visits to the park. The false 
information allowed us to determine whether the ad had an influence in altering the participant s 
memory or if it had been primarily used to cue an existing memory. Had we not included that false 
information, we would not be able to determine whether the ad had, in fact, exerted a transformational 
effect on memory. For instance, one participant recalled shaking hands with Mickey Mouse during his 
childhood visit to Disney. Did that ever really happen to him? It could be a false memory based on the 
exposure to the "truthful" ad—maybe that never happened to him, but the ad made him believe it did. 
There were some people, however, who did not become as involved with the false ad as with 
the true ad, because they detected the false information (as mentioned previously, we called these 
participants the "Bugs detectors"). In this case, the advertising was too discrepant from their own 
experience; this demonstrates the boundary condition for the advertising misinformation effect. This 
finding is consonant with per-suasion researchers, who find that incongruent information may stimulate 
greater thought (and perhaps distract attention from other parts) of the advertising (e.g., Meyers-Levy 
and Malaviya 1999). However, the number of "Bugs detectors" was too small here to gain much insight 
into how they were processing the false information differently from those who had accepted it. In the 
next experiment, we hoped to find out more information about the "Bugs detectors" and determine 
how they differ from those who use the ad to create false memories. These two measures could be 
viewed as proxy measures for those who embrace the ad (false memory creators) and those who 
discount it ("Bugs detectors").  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we varied how the false information was presented—either pictorially, 
verbally, or through both means—to see what aspect leads to the creation of false memories. In 
addition, as this experiment has the potential for more false memories as well as more "Bugs detectors," 
due to the greater amount of false information conditions, we hoped to further investigate what leads a 
person to create a false memory or to withstand such persuasion. 
Method  
Participants 
 One hundred (56 female, 44 male) undergraduates in a large Southeastern university 
participated in this experiment for course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of the three false 
information conditions. 
Stimuli 
All three ads were "false" in that they suggested that Bugs was associated with Disney. In the 
pictorial condition, this suggestion was conveyed by featuring a picture of Bugs at the bottom of the ad. 
In the verbal condition, it was conveyed with a headline on the ad saying, "Bugs Says It's Time to 
Remember the Magic," and then within the text by mentioning him as a character they might have 
shaken hands with as a child. In the "both" condition, it was conveyed using both types of false 
information.  
Procedure 
This experiment used the same procedure and measures as Experiment 1.  
Results  
False Memories  
We found that there was a picture superiority effect: Both conditions that contained the false 
picture of Bugs resulted in the greatest number of false memories, with the pictorial-only condition 
creating the most false memories, 48%, com-pared with the verbal presentation, 17%, and both, 32%, 
but only the pictorial- and verbal-only presentations were significantly different from one another (see 
Table 2). Confidence in meeting Bugs was also higher in the pictorial conditions, M = 4.7 for pictorial 
only, versus M = 2.5 for verbal only and M = 3.6 for both. 
Of interest was that the verbal-only condition, which resulted in the fewest false memories, also 
showed the greatest number of "Bugs detectors," 31% (n = 11) versus 12% (n = 4) in the pictorial-only 
condition and 8% (n = 3) in both. Both the comparisons between the pictorial- and verbal-only 
conditions and the comparison between verbal-only and both conditions were significantly different 
(see bottom of Table 2). 
"Bugs Detectors" Versus False Memory Creators 
Because we had a sizable number of "Bugs detectors" in this experiment (n = 17), we were able 
to investigate them in greater depth (see Table 3). We compared these detectors to those participants 
who had created false memories (n = 30). Our interest was whether the participants who discarded the 
ad information ("Bugs detectors") would process the ad, rate Disney, and report memories differently 
than those who had integrated the ad information into their own memory (i.e., the false memory 
creators). Some of the verbatim responses suggested this may be so. For example, one "Bugs detector" 
wrote: "Bugs Bunny isn't at Disney.... that distracted me while I read the ad because it gave me a sense 
that the ad was not really trying to plug into me remembering my Disney experience—rather, I looked 
for other clues for this to be a 'fake' ad." The false memory creators, on the other hand, focused more 
on their own experience while reading the ad: "I began to smile as I remembered the carefree days of 
my youth when my family made a trip to Disneyland, CA. I actually remember walking into Cinderella's 
castle with wide eyes and jaw dropped in won-der and amazement. When the ad mentioned the smells 
of foods... I remember how the continual onslaught of delicious smells made me so hungry all day. Our 
dad couldn't believe how four skinny little kids could pack away so much food. Disney has been a good 
memory for me for years!" 
On more objective, quantifiable measures, where the number of words written was not 
significantly different, the false memory creators and the "Bugs detectors" showed the same initial 
effort in their response to the ad. The content of their responses, however, did differ significantly, 
where the false memory creators wrote a more personal account in their writ-ten response. This 
personal involvement was also shown in the Wells scale, where false memory creators scored higher 
than the "Bugs detectors" in emotional involvement with the advertising. Overall, attitudes toward the 
ad were more favorable in the case of false memory creators. Moreover, the "Bugs detectors'" negative 
feelings about the misleading ad affected how they felt about Disney in general. They showed higher 
negative affect, less positive affect, and less favorable attitudes and intention to revisit. (Refer to the 
bottom of Table 3 for the statistical tests on these measures.) 
The memories recalled by these groups did not differ significantly in their length, clarity of 
recollection, emotional importance, or personal importance. Their memories were, however, influenced 
by whether or not they "bought" the advertising; the false memory creators had more pleasant 
memories and used more of the ad information in their recall than did the "Bugs detectors." 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this experiment was to determine what modality would most influence 
consumers' memory of their past childhood experience. We remind the reader that while it looks like 
there might have been differences in involvement across conditions, the only thing we manipulated in 
this experiment was the type of misinformation. All participants had ample time to read the advertising 
(five minutes), so if one were to compare these results to persuasion studies that manipulate level of 
involvement, this experiment would probably fall closer to high rather than low involvement.  
We found the pictorial information to be highly influential in the false memory creation process. 
The verbal-only condition led to the greatest number of "Bugs detectors" and resulted in the fewest 
false memories. Overall, the "Bugs detectors" had less favorable responses to the ad and showed less 
involvement with the ad, and that negative affect transferred to their attitude toward Disney. 
There are two ways to interpret the results on presentation modality. One possibility is that 
those in the verbal-only condition were processing the advertising at a deeper level (since they were 
more likely to detect Bugs), and were therefore less likely to create a false memory. The alternative ex-
planation is that those in the verbal condition were not processing the advertising deeply enough. While 
there may have been some diligent consumers who did notice the Bugs information and rejected it, 
perhaps there were also some potential false memory creators who overlooked it because it was not as 
prominent as the picture. The picture may be what allows some consumers to embrace Bugs as being 
part of their own memory. For instance, one "Bugs detector" in the verbal-only condition wrote in 
response to the ad: "All I could think about was that Bugs Bunny is a Warner Bros, character and not a 
Disney character. This was a huge distraction." 
 
To tease apart these explanations, we conducted Experiment 3, in which we added a memory 
test for the advertising information at the end of the session. We suggest that if deeper encoding of the 
advertising is occurring in the verbal conditions, participants would be more likely to recall the 
advertising information at a later time; if the alternative explanation prevails, then we would expect less 
memory for the advertising information in that condition compared with the other presentation 
conditions. We also thought it would be beneficial to utilize reaction time measures to explore what was 
happening in the case of pictorial-only and both presentation conditions. We chose a pictorial 
identification task, which is a better "match" for the false information and may lead to even more false 
memory identifications (Yamashita 1996). 
In addition, we incorporated the IAT into our design. The extended Bugs categorization within 
the IAT also allowed us to determine how deeply the false information had been integrated. For 
instance, although the "both" condition did not show an enhancement in Experiment 2, it could be that 
in this more semantic-oriented task there would be an advantage to seeing the false information in both 
pictorial and verbal formats. It is noteworthy that other researchers have found the picture superiority 
effect more prominent in explicit memory tests than in implicit ones (Weldon and Roediger 1987). The 
verbal presentation may have more of an advantage on the implicit task, as modality effects have also 
been found in that area (and there lies the match between verbal presentation within the ad and test). 
Experiment 3 
The intent of this experiment was to further investigate how the presentation of false 
information within advertising—verbal, pictorial, or both modalities—affects how consumers process, 
and ultimately remember, their past childhood experiences targeted in the advertising. In this 
experiment, we allowed participants a longer time to recall their past memory, added a reaction time 
identification test to measure the accessibility of certain images in memory, and, in addition, included a 
memory test for the advertising itself to ascertain how well the advertising (and false advertising 
information) was originally encoded.  
Method  
Participants  
One hundred ten (53 female, 57 male) undergraduates in a large Southeastern university 
participated in this experiment for course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of the three false 
information conditions.  
Stimuli  
The same ads used in Experiment 2 were used here. 
Procedure 
The participants were placed in groups of around thirty in a computer lab. They were handed 
the advertising information, and were asked to provide feedback on it for several minutes. They were 
then given 10 minutes to write about their own first childhood experience at a Disney resort. They filled 
out demographic questions and then proceeded to the computerized task. The computer task included 
two parts: recognition of items from their childhood visit to Disney, and then the IAT task (Appendix B 
contains a detailed explanation of this task). The main item of interest in the recognition test was the 
image of Bugs Bunny and whether participants identified him as part of the memory of their childhood 
experience and how confident they were that they did/did not meet him. 
The second part was the IAT task, where the main interest was in whether participants would 
categorize Bugs Bunny as belonging to the Disney or "other" theme park category. Participants had a 
total of six trials in which they had to classify Bugs Bunny as either belonging to Disney or another 
venue. 
Last, participants were given a written advertising memory test in which they were asked to 
recall everything they could remember from the Disney ad they had seen earlier in the hour. They were 
then asked to answer specific questions regarding the ad's content. The critical questions were: "What 
character did the child shake hands with?"; "What picture(s) appeared in the ad?"; and "What appeared 
in the ad's head-line?" These represented the parts of the ad that included the false information. 
Results 
Initial Response to the False Information 
As in Experiment 2, we found more "Bugs detectors" in the verbal-only condition, 34%, than in 
either the pictorial-only, 14%, or with both presentation styles, also at 14%, and the pictorial-only and 
both conditions were significantly less than the verbal-only condition (see Table 2 for the statistics). 
Memory Recalls 
We hoped that the longer recollection session would result in participants incorporating the 
false information into their own memory stories (the prior studies only allowed several minutes for their 
recollection). We found one participant in the both condition who integrated Bugs into her memory 
story: 
When I was 10, my parents took me and my sisters to Walt Disney World in Orlando, Florida. I 
remember that I was so excited. We all got up bright and early for the first day of excitement; we were 
going to the Magic Kingdom. This later was my most favorite place. As we entered the gates, the first 
thing I remember is seeing Chip and Dale. They were there to greet me and my family at the entrance. 
All I wanted to do is run around and have my picture taken with all the characters. I saw Bugs Bunny, 
Cinderella, Mickey and Minnie Mouse, and several other cartoon characters. I also got around 120 auto-
graphs. That day, the rides were not as appealing, because I loved the characters so much. I don't even 
remember eating that day, but I do know that when I got home I went through my autograph book, and 
reminisced on that day. It was great. 
This female participant was 10 at the time of her visit, and visited the park again at age 12. She 
was quite confident that her memory was veridical, giving us permission to send it home to her parents 
for their feedback (for another survey). 
False Memories 
As in Experiment 2, there were more false memories created in the pictorial conditions: 52% 
false identifications of Bugs for both the pictorial-only and both conditions, compared with 29% for the 
verbal-only condition (see the bottom of Table 2 for the statistical tests). It appeared that those who had 
received the pictorial-only information were faster, perhaps more "primed" than those in the other 
conditions, where processing may have been more "conscious." However, there was no significant 
difference in conditions in participants' response times to the false image: 2406 ms in both; 2021 ms in 
the pictorial-only condition; 2266 ms in the verbal-only condition. Nor was there a significant difference 
in confidence across conditions: 6.1 in both; 5.7 in the pictorial-only condition; 5.9 in the verbal-only 
condition. There was a greater advantage, however, on the Bugs classification task for false memory 
creators within the IAT for those who received the verbal in-formation; the overall model was significant 
at F(2, 42) = 4.87, p = .01, with a greater tendency to consistently classify Bugs as being associated with 
Disney, M = 5.1 for both, M = 5.3 for the verbal-only condition, and M = 3.8 for the pictorial-only 
condition. Tukey's post hoc comparisons revealed that the verbal-only and both conditions were 
significantly higher than the pictorial-only condition, at .05. 
Memory Test 
The advertising memory test was added as a means to gauge how well the false information had 
been originally encoded: greater recall would indicate more elaborate encoding; lesser recall, more 
superficial encoding. (See Table 4 for a summary of the results and the statistical tests.) 
We found participants remembered significantly more items in the pictorial conditions, with an 
average of 6.2 items from the ad recalled in the both condition, 5.1 in the pictorial-only condition, and 
4.7 in the verbal-only condition. Within those recall statements, we looked at whether participants had 
mentioned Bugs being part of the ad, and if so, whether they indicated seeing him in a picture or 
reading about him in the text or headline. As the dual-encoding explanation would predict, participants 
in the both condition had superior overall memory for Bugs, with 88% remembering him, compared with 
76% in the pictorial-only condition and 47% in the verbal-only condition. It appeared that the picture 
was driving the better recall results: In the both condition, 67% of participants specifically mentioned 
the picture in their recall statements, compared with only 8% mentioning either the headline or shaking 
hands reference. 
 
On the specific memory test items, the picture was remembered about equally well in the 
pictorial and both conditions, and few people in the verbal condition falsely remembered seeing the 
Bugs picture. Participants were about equal in their memory for the "shaking hands" item in the both 
and verbal-only conditions (and very few in the pictorial-only condition mistakenly remembered Bugs in 
the copy). The item that elucidated the most about processing was the headline question. There were 
significantly more people in the verbal-only condition who recalled the Bugs information correctly than 
in the other conditions, which indicates that participants in the verbal-only condition may have been 
merely reading the headline superficially and discarding the advertising information, whereas deeper 
processing may have been occurring in the other conditions, allowing for the creation of more re-
constructed memories. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this experiment was to better understand why fewer false memories are created 
in the verbal-only condition. Was it because participants were more careful in their examination of the 
ad, or, alternatively, less likely to encode the false information? We found, as in Experiment 2, that 
there were more "Bugs detectors" in the verbal-only condition. This appears to be due to participants' 
attention to the ad's head-line, which was better remembered at a later time, suggesting that the ad 
content (which was not better remembered) was not processed as deeply as it was in the other 
conditions. The picture superiority effect on false recognition appeared to prevail, with both the 
pictorial conditions being more likely to create a false memory than the verbal-only condition. This 
episodic memory is likely to be more affected by the test modality, whereas seeing a match in the ad 
picture and ad test would help to enhance the false recognition process (Yamashita 1996). There were 
significantly more false memories when the picture recognition testing technique was employed (as 
compared with Experiments 1 and 2, when the recognition test was verbal). 
The false verbal information appeared to be exerting a greater effect on semantic memory, 
where those who saw the name Bugs Bunny were more likely to consistently classify him as being 
associated with Disney. This implicit memory test was also in the same verbal format as the false verbal 
suggestion, so there may be effects due to modality there as well. The memory test revealed additional 
insights about the importance of having both verbal and pictorial information in the ad: There was 
better memory overall for the false implants. 
This experiment demonstrates that false information received in an advertisement can have 
multiple layers of effect on consumers' later recollections. Although most of these intrusions are found 
in the more mundane recognition tasks, this experiment found that the possibility exists for even more 
conscious intrusion, as one participant (who received the ad with both pieces of misinformation), on her 
own accord, took that false information and incorporated it into her memory story. 
General Discussion 
The title of this paper poses the question, "How and when can advertising influence memory for 
consumer experience?" In a series of three experiments, we sought to provide insight into those 
questions. First, the "how." We found that when post-experience information alters consumers' 
recollection processes, it does so in the same manner as if an actual experience had been cued. We 
found that pictures were an important aspect of this cuing process. Looking at the difference in the 
number of created memories between the paper-and-pencil tests of Experiment 2 and the pictorial 
reaction time test of Experiment 3 provides some additional insight into the process. Notice the greater 
number of false identifications in Experiment 3, especially in the cases where participants saw the false 
information as a picture. It is suggested that the picture "primed" them to later rate Bugs Bunny as being 
part of their past experience. This priming effect was picked up better with the more implicit measure of 
Experiment 3. Yet the IAT demonstrated that this priming crossed modalities and influenced some 
participants' semantic memory structure, where they later came to consistently rate Bugs Bunny as 
belonging to the Disney category. The modality of the testing instrument is thus a critical decision 
advertisers need to consider when assessing advertising influence—words may access one type of 
memory, pictures another type. 
When received only as a headline and within the longer text, the false words were more likely to 
be detected as "false," and less likely to be processed and integrated into consumers' memory than the 
pictorial information. When the false picture and words appeared together, however, they formed a 
stronger memory trace, influencing both implicit and explicit tests of memory. Having both modalities of 
misinformation may have made the false information seem more plausible. One participant noted the 
presence of Bugs Bunny when she received the ad, but really was not a "detector": "It made me think of 
being a little girl with my family. ... It makes me feel like a kid again, wanting to shake Bugs Bunny's 
hand." She seemed to feel that Bugs Bunny ought to be included in the ad—as if it was something she 
too remembered. Perhaps the picture was working at increasing participants' familiarity, as suggested 
by prior research (Hirschman 1986). 
Now, the "when" aspect of the question: As other memory researchers have found (Dodson and 
Schacter 2001; Loftus 1979), the post-experience advertising will not alter memory for a prior 
experience if participants notice the discrepancy of the information—in the present case, the "Bugs 
detectors." This discrepancy detection occurred at the encoding of the advertisement, but had rippling 
affects on attitude and behavior. Indeed, participants who detected the false Bugs in-formation 
reported becoming less personally involved with the advertising, lower attitudes toward the advertising, 
more negative attitudes toward Disney, and were less likely to be influenced by the advertising material 
overall. 
The somewhat paradoxical finding is that you want the consumer to be involved enough that 
they process the false information (Johar 1995) and make inferences from it, but not so involved that, as 
in this case, they notice the discrepancy between the advertising information and their own experience. 
While the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) may ban advertisers from presenting completely false 
information in their advertising, this finding suggests that advertisers not go too far in the puffery 
process if they want their information integrated and accepted as consumers' own. Deception falls in 
between false information and puffery on the information spectrum, and advertisers (and policymakers) 
ought to be aware that memory distortion may be an outcome of a misleading campaign. 
This research has implications for researchers interested in engineering experiences, especially 
after-the-fact, and researchers seeking indirect means to measure advertising effects. These issues and 
future research ideas are discussed next. 
Reengineering Consumer Experience 
"We find that advertising works the way the grass grows. You can never see it, but every week 
you have to mow the lawn" (Tarshis, quoted in Mayer 1991). The very fact that advertising cues may 
serve as frames to alter past, current, and future experience is not surprising in light of current re-search 
on memory. This research challenges the implicit assumption of much advertising research that memory 
is generally veridical, fixed, and reproductive. As addressed here, these memory effects can also provide 
us some insights into the underlying constructive decision processes involved in the post-experience 
advertising situation. 
It could be that there are similarities in messages intended to frame the consumer experience 
both before and afterward, for instance, conveying aspects of the consumption experience through the 
drama of the ad copy. An advertisement that refers to a common experience that many consumers can 
relate to, such as a holiday ritual or a theme park experience, has the potential to draw people into the 
ad. This may cause consumers to imagine themselves in the advertised event, vicariously experiencing 
the ritual as it is currently presented in the ad and conjuring up their own past experience (Boiler 1990; 
Deighton, Romer, and McQueen 1989; Wells 1986). 
There may also be aspects where the forward and backward framing differ, however. For 
instance, it is not clear that the pictorial cue would outweigh the verbal one when it precedes the 
experience. The pictorial aspect is an important part of consumers' recollection processes, and thus is 
important when reframing a past experience. One of the unifying aspects of the forward and backward 
framing findings is the agreement that consumers are generally unaware of the influence advertising has 
had on the interpretation of their experience, whether as a memory or as a perception. This means that 
more traditional self-report measures of advertising usage may be grossly underestimating the impact of 
advertising. Because of this more insidious effect on consumers, advertising re-searchers are urged to 
find more indirect measures to assess influence. 
Implications for Advertising Researchers 
Although cognitive research on false memories has not been a focal point in advertising 
journals, the effects of a reconstructive memory system have been noted by advertising researchers for 
some time. Advertisers are quite aware that false recognition of their advertising may occur—referred 
to as "slippage" due to competitive factors (Sutherland and Fried-man 2000). Furthermore, classic 
advertising research has found consumers have "recognized" ads they were never exposed to (e.g., 
Appel and Blum 1961; Lucas and Murphy 1939). These memory errors are due to an overloaded memory 
system that "reconstructs" and attempts to "make sense" out of the past. 
Of continual debate within the academic and practitioner world of advertising research has 
been the relevance of academic studies performed on undergraduates. Cornelissen and Lock suggest 
that theoretical academic articles can advance advertising thought and practice in symbolic ways: 
"Instead of offering specific technical advice with direct application, academic articles on advertising 
theory present information of conceptual and symbolic value of practitioners, suggesting different 
worldviews of organizational life" (2002, p. 54). The false memory paradigm was introduced here as a 
means to demonstrate that advertising can not only cue an existing memory in its execution, as many of 
the nostalgia type ads attempt to do, but through this cuing process, lead to memories that become 
more consistent with the advertisers' portrayal of reality than what, in fact, may have occurred during 
the consumer's own past. 
Braun (1999) suggested that memories that were enhanced and rehearsed with post-experience 
advertising were stronger and held with more confidence than memories that had not received such 
post-experience support. We found here that an autobiographical ad led to consumer memories that 
were consistent with the advertising message, but the only way to determine whether the advertising 
information had, in fact, influenced the memory was to consider the role of the false information. 
We understand that the existence of "false memories" may not be considered a favorable 
quality to the advertiser, and we do not support the intentional altering of consumers' pasts. We 
suggest, however, that advertisers may be doing this any-way, especially in campaigns that reference 
past experiences that not all consumers have had. Because true and false memories are recalled in 
similar ways, the findings of the false memory creators provide insight to advertisers interested in 
developing copy and images that best bring back the consumers' past. In fact, one could conceive of 
advertisers using a similar false memory design to determine what version of their own campaign may 
most influence the past. Rather than probing memory about the advertising itself, this paradigm al-lows 
researchers to assess whether the ad information becomes integrated into the source of information 
consumers say they rely on most in their decision making—their own experience. 
In addition to the false memory paradigm, this research discussed how reaction time tests could 
be incorporated into advertising testing. These implicit tests come closer to measuring consumers' 
imagery regarding the advertising, which they might not have been able to verbalize in a more 
traditional self-report situation. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our studies were conducted within a narrow context of potential false memories?—memories 
for childhood experiences. This context, one could argue, would be easier to change than a memory 
coming from a more recently experienced encounter if it weren't for the fact that the experience 
targeted was what many consider (our participants included) a monumental childhood event. Thus far, 
the majority of false advertising research focused on childhood events has used the Disney/ Bugs 
experience (e.g., Braun, Ellis, and Loftus 2002). Future research ought to consider targeting memories 
from different moments in consumers' lives, as well as focusing across different product categories. An 
interesting investigation would be to consider what type of products might benefit most with such a 
memory/experiential focus. 
The false memory paradigm allows the researcher to study the influence of particular 
experimental factors on consumers' retention of advertising information; the verbal versus pictorial 
debate is only one advertising debate that could be better understood through this design. For instance, 
to tie this research together with the forward framing research, one might investigate the order of 
information presentation: Is an ad received before an experience more successful in trans-forming it in 
memory than an ad received afterward? 
Other research might consider expanding the modality is-sue to include radio, television, and 
print ads to determine which medium is most influential in modifying consumer memory. Individual 
differences in response to advertising also ought to be examined; memory researchers find that both 
the very young and the very old tend to be more susceptible to false suggestions than the population at 
large. Both these groups are viewed as "protected classes," and policymakers who feel that a particular 
campaign may be "crossing the line" could put it to test in this paradigm to determine if it is, indeed, 
creating false memories. 
The reconstructive memory process allows consumers to think, retain, and integrate 
information from various sources. The false memories highlighted in this research are one of the 
negative consequences of this dynamic system. To know that a memory is reconstructed and not 
necessarily a veridical representation does not make it any less meaningful or enjoyable at the time the 
person is remembering an event. The advertising researcher needs to consider the emotional 
consequences of memory, as well as the multiple layers of effect it has on consumer judgments. 
Memory is a complex system: At times we are able to recall experiences from early childhood; other 
times we cannot even remember a phone number read to us by a 411 operator. Different techniques 
are needed to uncover the many levels of memory; recall and recognition tests employed by most 
advertising researchers only get at the tip of the iceberg. 
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Appendix A- Measures Presented at Advertising Encoding/Exposure 
Free Response 
Marketers target consumers with different types of advertising messages. There are many ways 
to judge aft ad's effectiveness. Here we're interested in your own personal reflections of the ad—how it 
made you feel, what it made you think about. 
We want you to read it, elaborating and imaging its content. In the space provided below, write 
down what went through your mind as you were reading the ad. Don't hold back. Try to write as much 
as you can. All can be helpful. There's no rush…you'll have five minutes to complete this and answer 
several advertising scales that appear at the end of this page and on the next page. 
Attitude Toward the Ad 
 
How would you rate the ad overall? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unfavorable         Favorable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bad         Good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unpleasant         Pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Negative         Positive 
Wells R Scale  
How involving was the ad for you? Fill out the following scales:  
I felt I was right there in the ad, experiencing the situation again. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly 
Disagree 
        Strongly 
Agree 
 
I really got involved in the feelings provoked by the ad. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly 
Disagree 
        Strongly 
Agree 
 
While I was looking at the ad, I could easily put myself in the situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly 
Disagree 
        Strongly 
Agree 
 
While looking at the ad, I felt that the events were happening to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly 
Disagree 





We're interested in your thoughts and feelings regarding Disney and its resorts. Rate DisneyTM on the 
following scales:  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unfavorable         Favorable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bad         Good 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unpleasant         Pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Negative         Positive 
 
Likelihood of (re)visiting a DisneyTM resort: 








We are also interested in your feelings toward DisneyTM. Below you'll see a list of words, and underneath 
each, a scale. Mark toward the end of the scale how well that word represents your feelings toward 
DisneyTM [The scales were anchored by 1 = strongly disagree, 10 = strongly agree. The words that 
represented positive affect were: joyous, affectionate, loving, sentimental, exciting, happy, satisfying, 
delighted, proud, fond. The words that represented negative affect were: embarrassing, annoying, 
frustrating, angry, fearful, regretful, sad, nervous. "Surprising" was not included because it was not 
found to correlate with either the positive or negative words.] 
Memory of Visiting Disney as a Child 
Free Recall 
Have you ever been to ANY of the DisneyTM resorts? Y N 
At approximately what age did you visit? ________. (Please list all visits) 
What happened during your earliest visit to the resort (under the age of 10)? 
Recall Scales 
How well did you remember your earliest childhood experience? 















Rate the pleasantness of your childhood visit using the following scale. (Circle one) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Extremely 
unpleasant 
  Neutral   Extremely 
pleasant 
 
What was your emotional involvement in your visit to the resort? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Nothing Little Moderate Considerable Extreme 
 
Rate the personal importance of this visit to your childhood: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




Disney is interested in what childhood characters young adults remember meeting at the resort. 
Please indicate your confidence that you met the following characters when you were under 10 years 
old. [Bugs appeared third on the list, with scales anchored by 1 = not very confident, 10 = very 
confident.] 
Which characters did you actually meet in person (e.g., "shake their hand")? Place an X in front 
of all characters you met personally under the age of 10. [Bugs appeared third on the list.] 
Appendix B-Computerized Task Instructions 
The recognition task began with these instructions, which appeared on participants' computer screens:  
We're interested in what people, places, and things you remember from your earliest visit to a 
Disney resort. For this part of the study you will be presented with pictures of rides, attractions, 
and characters. Some are from Disney; others are not. We want you to indicate, whether or not 
the image you see is something you remember experiencing during your visit by pressing the Y 
key if so, and the N key if not. Please try to react as fast as possible. Following your answer, you 
will be asked to indicate how confident you are in your response. Press any key to start. 
An image of Donald Duck then appeared, and after pressing either Y or N, the following statement 
appeared on the screen: 
If you indicated Y, how confident are you? [where 1 = not very confident, 7 = very confident]. If 
you indicated N, how confident are you that you DID NOT experience the previous image during 
your childhood visit to Disney? [where 1 = not very confident, 7 = very confident]. 
Images of Sebastian, Mickey, and then the critical Bugs Bunny appeared, after which other characters 
and rides appeared so as to not draw attention to the purpose of this task. 
The IAT (Implicit Association Test) was introduced with the following: 
In the next task you will be presented with a set of words to classify into groups, such as words 
representing Disney or associated with other theme parks and entertainment venues. Be sure to 
notice the concept names at the top of the screen [Disney appeared on participants' left; "Other" 
was seen on their right]. Press e FAST for words described by the left concept name. Press / FAST 
for words represented by the right concept name. X will appear when you press the wrong key. 
Whenever X appears, press the other key immediately. Press the spacebar to proceed. GO FAST. 
Some mistakes are OK. 
The participants then began their IAT session. These word choices came from the IAT site, 
https://www.implicit.harvard.edu/im-plicit/. The critical categorization task involved the Disney/other 
trial where the Disney words consisted of Euro Disney, Mickey Mouse, Space Mountain, Goofy, 
Disneyland, Peter Pan, Walt Disney World, Epcot, and the non-Disney words were Universal Studios, Sea 
World, Sylvester, Busch Gardens, Six Flags, Visionland, Daffy Duck, Tweety. Bugs Bunny appeared within 
this trial, but unlike the other words, no X appeared if he was incorrectly identified as being part of 
Disney. The experiment was then repeated with the concept names changing sides.  
